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154 QUINTAL tI. LAUREL GROVE HOSPITAL [62 C.2d 
[So F. No. 21771. In Bank. Dec. 14,1964.] 
REGINALD J. QUINTAL, a Minor, etc., et a1., Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, V. LAUREL GROVE HOSPITAL et a1., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
[1] Judgments - Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict - When 
Granted.-A motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict 
for plaintiff may properly be granted only when, disregarding 
conflicting evidence and indulging in every inference in plain-
tiff's favor, the result is a determination that there is no 
evidence of substantial nature to support the verdict. 
[2] Id.-Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict-Hearing: Review.-
On a motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict for 
plaintiff, the trial court is not permitted to weigh the evidence; 
on an appeal from the judgment entered on granting such 
motion, th-e appellate court must read the record in the light 
most advantageous to plaintiff, resolve all conflicts in his 
favor, and give him the benefit of all reasonable inferences 
in support of the judgment. 
[3] Physicians-Malpractice-Standard of Care and Skill.-Med-
ical specialists are held to that standard of learning and skill 
normally possessed by such specialists in the same or similar 
locality under the same or similar circumstances. 
[4] Id.-Malpractice-Actions-Questions for JUr)'.-In a mal-
practice suit based on a 6-year-old boy's being mute, blind, 
and a spastic quadriplegic as a result of a cardiac arrest 
during administration of an anesthetic, the evidence was suffi-
cient to go to the jury on the question of two doctors' negli-
gence, where there was testimony to the effect that if due care 
is used a cardiac arrest does not ordinarily occur, where it 
appeared that on the morning of the operation the boy was 
very apprehensive and had a fever, both being danger signals, 
and where there was some expert testimony from which the 
jury could infer that proper care required that one of the 
doctors, an ophthalmologist, either should have performed a , 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 45; Am.Jur., Judgments (rev 
ed § 297). 
[3] See CaI.Jur.2d, Physicians, Dentists, and Other Healers of 
the Sick, § 76; Am.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons (1st ed § 90). 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 113(1); [2J Judgments, 
§§ 113(4), 113(5); [3] Physicians, § 51(3); [4] Physicians, § 57; 
[5) Physicians, § 59; [6, 8] Negligence, § 133(1); [7) Negligence, 
§ 142; [9] Hospitals, § 20; [10] New Trial, § 99. 
t. 
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thoracotomy or should have taken steps to have someone 
present to perform sueh operation. 
[6] Id.-Malpractice-Actions-Instructions. - In a malpractice 
suit based on a 6-year-old boy's being mute, blind, and a 
spastic quadriplegic as a result of a cardiac arrest during 
administration of an anesthetic, where it appeared that res 
ipsa loquitur applied if the jury could find certain facts which 
they were entitled to find from the evidence, but where there 
was also evidence that the injury could occur without negli-
gence, the jury should be instructed that if they find certain 
facts to be true they should apply the inference involved in 
res ipsa loquitur. 
[6] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitnr-When Doctrine Applies.-
Generally, res ipsa loquitur applies when the accident is of 
such a nature that it can be said, in the light of past experi-
ence, that it probably was the result of negligence by some-
one and that defendant is probably the person who is 
responsible. 
[7] Id.-Evidence-Circumstantial Evidence.-Negligence and con-
necting defendant with it, like other facts, can bl' proved by 
circumstantial evidence. There does not have to be an eye-
witness, nor need there be direct evidence of defendant's 
conduct, and there is no absolute requirement that plaintiff 
explain how the accident happened. 
[8] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-When Doctrine Applies.-Res ipsa 
loquitur may apply where the cause of injury is a mystery, 
if there is a reasonable and logical inference that defendant 
was negligent and that such negligence caused the injury. 
[9] Hospitals-Actions-Questions for Jury. - In a malpractice 
suit against a hospital and an anesthesiologist based on a 6-
year-old boy's being mute, blind, and a spastic quadriplegic 
as a result of a cardiac arrest during administration of an 
anesthetic, where the anesthesiologist testified that he had an 
active part in the management of the hospital and that as 
acting administrator he came to an agreement with the 
group of anesthesiologists with whom he was connected to 
furnish a proper anesthesiologist on demand of the hospital, 
where the hospital furnished the nurses who attended the boy 
and the op-erating room nurses, together with all equipment 
used by th~ anesthesiologist, and where the boy's mother, as 
required by the hospital officials, signed an "Authority to 
Operate," the question of agency for the hospital was one of 
fact for the jury. 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 307 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negli-
gence (1st ed § 295 et seq). 
) 
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[10] New Trial-Insufliciency of Evidence-Discretion-Review.- \ 
The granting of a new trial for insufliciency of the evidence 
is within the trial court's discretion .. It is only w?cre ~t can I 
be said as a matter of law that there 1S no substanbaJ eVIdence I 
to support a different judgment that an appellate court will 
reverse an order granting a new trial on such ground. , 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Ala- \ 
meda County and from orders granting a new trial. Cecil \ 
Mosbacher, Judge. Judgments reversed; orders affirmed. i 
" \ 
Action for damages for medical malpractice. Judgments I 
for defendants notwithstanding verdicts ·for plaintiffs, re- I 
versed; alternative orders granting all defendants a new trial \ 
affirmed. ! 
Jeremiah F. O'Neill, Jr., George W. Hauer and Robert A. 
Kaiser for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
Hardin, Fletcher, Cook & Bayes, Cyril Viadro, Peart, 
Baraty & Hassard, George A. Smith, Joseph F. Rankin and 
Richard G. Logan for Defendants and Respondents. 
PETERS, J.-Plaintiffs appeal from judgments notwith-
standing the verdicts, and from alternative orders grant-
ing all defendants a new trial. In our opinion the judg-
ments notwithstanding the verdicts must be reversed, and 
the orders granting a new trial must be affirmed. 
The case revolves around the tragic experiences of plain-
tiff, Reginald Quintal (Reggie), who, in July of 1960, when 
the events here involved occurred, was 6 years of age. Prior 
to July 11, 1960, Reggie was a normal, healthy child, suffer-
ing only from an inward deviation of the eyes. On July 10, 
1960, he entered the defendant hospital for the purpose of hav-
ing this condition corrected by a minor operation to be per-
formed on July 11, 1960, by defendant Dr. Palmberg. On 
the morning of that day, during the course of the adminis-
tration of the anesthetic by defendant Dr. Thornburg, Reggie 
suffered a cardiac arrest. He was resuscitated by means 
of an ope~chest heart massage. As a result of his brain being 
deprived of oxygen during the period his heart was stopped, 
he suffered severe brain damage resulting in his becoming a 
spastic quadriplegic, blind" and mute. Reggie, through his 
guardian ad litem, his mother, brought this action against 
the two doctors and the hospital for malpractice. His mother 
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sued for general and special damages. The jury returned 
verdicts against all three defendants and in favor of Reggie 
for $400,000, the precise amount prayed for in the complaint, 
and in favor of the mother for her special damages of 
$3,610.73. The trial court had denied motions for non suits 
and for directed verdicts, but granted the motions of all of 
the defendants for judgments notwithstanding the verdicts, 
and in the alternative, awarded all defendants, by an appro-
priate written order, a new trial on the grounds of excessive 
damages, insufficiency of the evidence, and that the verdicts 
were against the law. 
The facts are as follows: In 1960, Reggie was suffering 
from some inward deviation of the eyes, but otherwise was 
normal and healthy. On May 8, 1960, he was taken to 
Laurel Grove Hospital in Castro Valley for an operation 
aimed at correcting the eye condition. The operation was 
performed by defendant Dr. Palmberg, an ophthalmologist, 
and was completed without incident. The anesthesiologist 
at that first operation is not a party to this case. He was an 
associate of defendant Dr. Thornburg. The first operation 
was not entirely successful in curing the deviation, and, after 
conservative treatment failed to cure the condition, it was 
decided that another operation was necessary. On July 
10, 1960, Reggie was again taken to the Laurel Grove Hospital 
for an operation scheduled for the next morning, and esti-
mated to take 20 minutes. Dr. Palmberg was to do the eye 
surgery, and Dr. Thornburg was to administer the anesthetic. 
The evening Reggie entered the hospital he was crying, with 
a running nose, was quite apprehensive, and was uncoopera-
tive. The medical record in fact shows that just before 
surgery he was "very apprehensive" and "very agitated." 
He had a temperature when he first arrived at the hospital, 
which increased up to midnight. The hospital records pur-
port to show that his temperature, just before the opera-
tion, was a little under normal, but by expert testimony it 
was shown that there had been a correction and erasure in 
that record, and what the original record showed does not 
appear. The erasure was not explained by defendants. The 
records also show that it was therein noted that the pre-
operative medication aimed at sedating the patient was 
"unsatisfactory. " 
When Dr. Palmberg entered the operating room Reggie 
was already there, and Dr. Thornburg was administering the 
anesthetic in a normal fashion. Dr. Palm berg took no 
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part in administering the anesthetic, but remained in the 
room some distance from the operating table talking to an 
assistant about the intended operation. 
During the administration of the anesthetic, and before 
the process had been entirely completed, Reggie suffered a 
respiratory arrest followed by a cardiac arrest. This means 
that his breathing and heart stopped. This, of course, cut 
off blood and oxygen to his brain. The record shows that 
the brain, without damage, may be without oxygen for not 
more than three minutes, but that every second over the 
three-minute limit endangers the patient and makes brain 
damage more probable. 
When the respiratory and cardiac arrests occurred, Dr. 
Thornburg called out that Reggie's heart had stopped beat-
ing. Dr. Palmberg and his as.o;istant rushed toward the 
table. Dr. Thornburg let toe anesthetic gases out of the 
anesthetic bag, filled the bag with pure oxygen, pumped 
the bag with one hand and with the other attempted to 
restore Reggie's heart action by external massage. This 
process was continued for 20 or 30 seconds and was then 
stopped to ascertain if the boy's heart had started. It had 
not. The process was repeated for another 20 to 30 seconds, 
but without success. Dr. Thornburg then asked Dr. Palm-
berg to open Reggie's chest in order to administer manual 
massage to toe heart. Dr. Thornburg emphasized that this 
operation had to be -done very quickly. Dr. Palmberg 
stated that he did not feel qualified to perform such an 
operation, and started to leave the operating room to get 
help. Just near the door to the operating room he encoun-
tered Dr. Beumer, a surgeon. Dr. Beumer, at Dr. Palmberg's 
request, entered the operating room, was quickly gloved, 
and was handed a scalpel. He opened Reggie's chest and 
began lleart massage. The heart responded almost immedi-
ately, and began once again to beat. The beat at first was un-
even and it was twice necessary to use a defibrillator (an in-
strument that gives electric shocks to the heart) to correct 
the defective heart action. .Although the evidence is confusing 
and. somewhat in conflict, that most favorable to appellants 
is that about four minutes elapsed between the time Dr. 
Thornburg first noticed that the heart had stopped and the 
time the heart was again started by means of the open heart 
massage. Sometime after tIle operation it was dis('overed that 
as a result of brain damage Reggie was a spastic quadriplegic 
Dec. 1964) QUINTAL V. LAUREL GROVE HOSPITAL 
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and was both blind and mute. The condition appears to be 
permanent. 
The plaintiffs' counsel, on the question of the propriety 
of the procedures employed, did not produce any independ-
ent expert witnesses, but relied on the cross-examination of 
the two respondent doctors, called under the provisions of 
section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and upon 
the cross-examination of the defendants' expert witnesses. The 
trial judge refused to instruct on the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur, but, after denying motions for nonsuits and directed 
verdicts, submitted the case to the jury on the basic question 
of whether the evidence showed that any or all of the 
defendants were guilty of negligence proximately causing 
the injuries. Proper instructions on the use of circum-
stantial evidence were given. The jury brought in the 
verdicts above mentioned. The court thereafter granted 
the motions of all of the defendants for judgments notwith-
standing the verdicts, and in the alternative granted defend-
ants' motion for a new trial. 
The propriety of the jUdgments notwithstanding Ihe verdicts. 
These must be considered, of course, as to each defendant 
separately, although many of the facts are pertinent to two 
or more of the defendants. 
[1] The rules applicable to judgments notwithstanding 
the verdict for defendant are well settled and are agreed 
to by all the parties. Such a motion may be granted, prop-
erly, only when, disregarding the conflicting evidence, and 
indulging in every legitimate inference in favor of the 
plaintiff, the result is a determination that there is no evi-
dence of substantial nature to support the verdict. [2] The 
trial court, on such motion, is not permitted to weigh the 
evidence, and on an appeal from the judgment entered on 
the granting of such a motion, the appellate court must read 
the record in the light most advantageous to the plaintiff, 
resolve all conflicts in his favor, and give him the benefit of 
all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. 
The propriety of the judgments notwithstanding as 10 Dr. 
Palm berg and Dr. Thornburg. 
[3] Both of these defendants are highly qualified and 
competent specialists. Dr. Thornburg is an American board 
certified anesthesiologist, and Dr. Palmberg is an American 
board certified ophthalmologist. They are, of course, held 
to that standard of learning and skill normally possessed 
) 
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by such specialists in the same or similar locality under 'the;, 
same or similar circumstances. The question involved is~ 
whether there is any evidence in the record to show, or;;1 
from which it may reasonably be inferred, that either doctor, ~~ 
or both, failed to meet the standard involved. In our opinion f1 
the evidence, independently of any possible application of I 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, is sufficient to support &'l 
verdict against the two doctors.; 
[4] There was evidence that Reggie's cardiac arrest was 1 
caused by "vagal stimulation," that is stimulation of the ! 
vagus nerve, a basic nerve involved in the beating of the heart. 
Cardiac arrest is a known and calculated risk in the giving I' 
of a general anesthetic. The statistics produced as to its i 
frequency are highly conflicting. Certainly it can be said 
that it occurs rarely but constantly. It can be caused by 
negligence. Thus it can be caused by an improper mixture 
of the anesthetic, by careless intubation, by giving the anes-
thetic while the patient has some infection, by an improper 
mixture of oxygen during anesthesia and by several other 
causes. It can also result where there is no negligence on 
the part of the doctors. Thus, it can result from cardiac 
disease, from unknown and hidden idiosyncrasies of the 
body, from an upset in the electrolyte balance of the body, 
and from other unknown causes. In the present case al-
though the cause-vagal stimulation-was known, the cause 
of such stimulation was unknown. No expert testified, 
directly, as to the cause of the cardiac arrest suffered by 
Reggie. 
While there was no direct testimony that the most likely 
cause of the vagal stimulation was negligence, there was 
evidence to the effect that if due care is used a cardiac arrest 
does not ordinarily, but can, occur. Defendants testified 
that several of the unknown causes were not here present, 
but their credibility in this respect was for the jury. Dr. 
Cullen, president of the American Board of Anesthesiology 
and chairman of the Department of Anesthesiology of the 
University of California, opined that 90 per cent of the 
deaths occurring in patients under anesthesia were due to 
improper management of. the airway. The hospital reports, 
available to both doctors, showed, without explanation, that 
the preoperative medication used in May had been more than 
doubled in July; that when the boy arrived at the hospital 
he was apprehensive, uncooperative, crying and agitated. 
The records disclosed that on the morning of the operation 
) 
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the boy was "very apprehensive" and ., very agitated" and 
that the preoperative medication had been "Wlsatisfactory." 
The records also show that after his admission to the hospital 
on the 10th he had a rising temperature Wltil at least mid-
night. The r~cords also purport to show that the next morn-
ing the temperature was below normal, but there is expert 
testimony that this record had been altered, and it may be 
that the erased record showed a rising temperature. Both 
apprehension and the rising temperature are danger signals. 
Dr. Thornburg testified that any rise in temperature would 
cause the doctor to investigate; that fever is usually an indica-
tion of infection that might stimulate the vagus nerve; that 
~~ a rise in temperature was caused by an infection the 
patient should not be submitted to anesthesia until the 
symptoms had been alleviated, preferably for about 72 hours. 
In that connection it must be remembered that this was an 
elective and not an emergency surgery, in that there was 
110 medical necessity for it to be performed at any particular 
time. Apprehension is also an important factor. Appre-
hension is an emotional state or reaction, and causes adren-
aline to be pumped into the circulatory system. This increases 
the sensitivity of the heart. This can cause a reaction to 
the vagus nerve in that it can cause an increase in blood 
pressure and an increase in the pulse rate. Thus, in the 
present case we have fever, and we have apprehension. Either 
were danger signals. It is trlle that the doctors involved 
testified that they considered such factors and for various 
reasons found them not convincing, but the veracity of such 
testimony from interested witnesses was for the jury. 
All of these factors apply to both doctors, both of whom 
knew the facts, had access to the records, and either could 
have called off the operation if he believed it would be 
dangerous. 
There is another important factor relating to negligence 
on the part of Dr. Palmbcrg. It will be remembered that 
when Dr. Thornburg asked him to open the boy's chest, empha-
sizing that time was essential, he stated that he did not 
feel compet~nt to do so and sought someone that was. He 
ruslled to the door of the operating room and found Dr. 
Beumer. Dr. Beumer came into the room, was gloved, was 
llanded a scalpcl, and then opened Reggie's chest. Although 
a surgeon, he had never before performed such an operation. 
There was much relevant testimony on the problems pre-
sented by this evidence. Various experts stated that car-
&Z C.2d-l 
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Wac arrest was a known risk in all general anesthesia cases,' 
and Dr. Palmberg admitted that he knew that this was 
so. Open chest surgery, in 1960, was the normal way of 
handling such a problem, if external massage was not suc-
cessful. Dr. Palmberg knew that this was so. The medical 
profession, generally, was quite concerned about this problem. 
In Alameda County, the medical association furnished lec-
turers, movies and demonstrations on this problem and how 
it should be handled, not only to the members of the general 
association, but to the specialist groups such as the ophthalmol-
ogists. Plaques, with directions as to how to handle the 
emergency, were placed in each operating room in the county. 
Dr. Palmberg admitted knowing that time was of the essence 
in such cases, and that every second over three minutes that 
the brain was deprived of oxygen increased the danger of 
permanent brain damage. Although the times involved in 
the instant case cannot be determined with precision, there 
is substantial evidence that Reggie's heart was stopped for 
four !ninutes before Dr. Beumer was successful in starting 
it. Just how many seconds were consumed after Dr. Palmberg 
announced that he did not feel competent to perform the 
operation, then rushed to the door, found Dr. Beumer, brought 
him into the operating room, had him gloved, and handed 
a scalpel so the operation could proceed, does not accurately 
appear in the record. It is a reasonable inference that 
most of a minute was so consumed, certainly at least 30 to 
45 seconds. These were the dangerous seconds. It can be 
inferred that they were the brain damaging seconds. 
Under such facts, two questions immediately arise. Would 
reasonable prudence have required that Dr. Palmberg, al-
though an ophthalmologist, a surgeon, but a specialist, possess 
the skill to perform such a relatively simple operation' He 
was required to take and did take general surgery courses 
in medical school. If Dr. Palmberg did not possess such 
skill, does not reasonable care require that such a surgeon 
see to it that a competent surgeon is immediately in attend-
ance to meet this emergency if it should ariseT Because 
of th~ known time limits involved, by "immediately" avail-
able is meant not in the hospital, but in the operating room 
itself. These are difficult questions. It is arguable that 
the standard of due Care involved in this respect does hot 
require expert evidence, that is, that the required standard 
of care is so clear that it is a matter that the jury could decide 
without expert evidence. However, it is unnecessary to rely 
) 
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on common knowledge in this case because there is expert 
testimony from which the jury could infer that the proper 
standard of due care required Dr. Palmberg to perform the 
operation, or if not, to have had someone immediately avail-
able who could perform it. 
lt is true that thcre is expert evidence from the defendants 
and from their witnesses that the standard of care then 
prevalent in Alameda County did not require that an oph-
thalmologist be competent to perform a thoracotomy. But 
there is other expert evidence from these very same witnesses 
that would support an inference to the contrary. All thc 
witnesses admitted that the possibility of a cardiac arrest 
was a known risk. All admitted that the operating surgeon, 
regardless of his sepecialty, should be prepared in some way. 
Dr. Dugan, a thoracic surgeon, although he testified he did 
not believe an ordinary ophthalmologist was qualified to 
open a chest, and that if he were the patient he would take 
the fellow in the hall, even if to get him consumed 30 seconds. 
rather than have an unqualified man open his chest, admitt~d 
on cross-examination that "Anybody, any surgeon who is 
operating in a hospital, I will admit and agree, in dire 
circumstances should be able to do an open chest operation." 
Certainly, the circumstances here involved were "dire," 
and every second was precious. The fact that Dr. Beumer 
was available as quickly as he was was a coincidence and 
not a planned procedure. Thus the jury could have inferred 
from the testimony that either Dr. Palmberg should have 
performed the thoracotomy, or should have taken steps to 
llave someone present to do so. 
Thus the evidence, while circumstantial, was sufficient to 
go to the jury on the question of the two doctors' negligence. 
This is so without any reference to .or reliance upon the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Independently of that doc-
trine, there is evidence sufficient to permit the jury to infer 
negligence on the part of the doctors. But because a new 
trial is required, something should be said about whether 
the jury on such new trial should be instructed on thc 
doctrine. Weare of the opinion that it should. 
It is somewhat difficult to separate the so-called conditional 
res ipsa doctrine from inferences predicated on circumstantial 
evidence, because res ipsa in such a case is, of course, a 
doctrine fundamentally predicated on circumstantial evi-
dence, and the weigllt that sllOuld be given to it. 
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tion where the conditional doctrine of res ipsa applies. Ifl 
the jury finds certain facts, which they are entitled' to find 
from the evidence, then the doctrine applies. Here we have 
an injury which is very rare. It is an injury that could 
result from negligence, or could result without negligence. 
Is it more probable than not that it was the result of negli-
gence T That is the question. The plaintiffs, out of the mouths 
of defendants and their witnesses, proved that the injury 
could occur as a result of negligence. There is also evidence 
that the injury could occur without negligence. In such 
circumstances the jury should be instructed that if they 
find certain facts to be true they should apply the infer-
ence involved in res ipsa. Here we have an injury that is 
a known risk and rarely occurs. 'Ve have the instrumentality 
and the procedures involved completely in the control of 
defendant doctors. \Ve have tlle boy under an anesthetic. 
Certainly the facts called for an explanation. The defend-
ant.'> explained what they did and testified that this was due 
care. But there was testimony that 90 per cent of the deaths 
resulting from cardiac arrest occurred by reason of faulty 
intubation. There was testimony that would justify the 
jury in inferring that if the operation had been performed 
within three minutes of the heart stoppage brain damage 
would not have resulted. We have evidence that temperature 
and apprehension increase the risk. We have the evidence 
of the erasures on the temperature chart. Under these 
circumstances the jury could find that it is more probable 
than not that the injury was the result of negligence. That 
is the test. 
[6] As stated in Fowler v. Seaton, 61 Ca1.2d 681, 686 
[39 Ca1.Rptr. 881, 394 P.2d 697] : 
"It is our opinion that the jury could find that the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur applies under the facts here involved. 
Generally, that doctrine applies 'where the accident is of 
such a nature that it can be said, in the light of past experi-
ence, that it probably was the result of negligence by someone 
and that the defendant. is probably the person who is respon-
sible.' (Siv.crson v. W cber, 57 Ca1.2d 834, 836 [22 Ca1.Rptr. 
337,372 P.2d 97] ; accord Faulk v. Sobcf'OlIcs, 56 Ca1.2d 466, 
470 [14 Cal.Rptr. 545, 363 P.2d 593]; Zentz v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co., 39 Ca1.2d 436, 446 [247 P.2d 344].) ... 
"One of the frequently quoted statement,> of tIle applicabh' 
rules is to be found in the opinion of Chief Justice Erlf' in 
Scott v. London &'; St. Kllthc1'inc Docks Co. (1865) 3 II. & C. 
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596, quoted in Prosser on 'I'ort. .. (2d ed. 1955) section 42, at 
page 201, as follows: 'There must be reasonable evidence of 
negligence; but where the thing is shown to be under the 
management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident 
is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen 
if those who have the management use proper care, it affords 
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the 
defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.' 
[7] "Of course, negligence and connecting defendant 
with it, like other facts, can be proved by circumstantial evi-
dence. There does not have to be an eyewitness, nor need 
there be direct evidence of defendant's conduct. There 
is no absolute requirement that the plaintiff explain how 
the accident happened. [8] Res ipsa loquitur may apply 
where the cause of the injury is a mystery, if there is a 
reasonable and logical inference that defendant was negligent, 
and that such negligence caused the injury. (Prosser on 
Torts, supra at p. 204.) " 
It is true that in Siverson v. Weber, 57 Ca1.2d 834, 836 [22 
Cal.Rptr. 337, 372 P.2d 97], the court affirmed a nonsuit in 
favor of a surgeon where the medical experts all testified that 
they could not determine the cause of the fistula there in-
volved, and that fistulas do occur although due care is used. 
There is similar testimony here. The court in Siverson, supra, 
listed the usual causes of such injury and then stated 
(p.838): 
"There is nothing to indicate that if the fistula was caused 
by any of the factors listed above or any combination of 
them the injury sustained by the plaintiff was a result of 
negligence." And again at page 839: "No medical witness 
testified that in the rare cases where fistulas occur they 
are more probably than not the result of negligence." The 
court emphasized that the fact a particular injury is a rare 
occurrence does not in itself prove that the injury was 
probably caused by negligence. 
Each case, of course, must be determined on its own facts. 
Here the facts> are somewhat similar to those in Davis v. 
Memorial Hospital, 58 Cal.2d 815 [26 Cal.Rptr. 633, 376 
P.2d 561J. There a rectal absc~ occurred after an enema. 
There was medical evidence that 90 per cent of all such 
abscesses result from bacterial infection, that a mucous mem-
brane normally prevents such infection, and that in the 
medical expert's opinion the insertion of the enema tube 
caused the break. There was other expert testimony that 
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the abscess was not<'fJo'i~usedKand.probably resulted from 
other causes. After referring to the rule stated in Siverson 
v. llT eber, supra, 57 Cal.2d 834, 836, above quoted, the court 
in Davis stated (p. 817) : "Where the evidence is conflicting 
or subject to different inferences as to a fact necessary to the 
applicability of the doctrine, for example, as to whether 
an accident claimed by the plaintiff happened or whether 
an injury was caused by the conduct of the defendant rather 
than by the acts of someone else, the question of fact must be 
left to the jury under proper instructions. [Citations.] " 
The court held that res ipsa instructions on a conditional 
basis should have been given. 
The evidence in the present case, although not as strong 
as in Davis, is nevertheless sufficient to warrant conditional 
instructions on res ipsa. Dr. Cullen did testify that 90 per 
cent of the deaths occurring in patients under anesthesia 
from cardiac arrests were due to improper management of 
the airway. There was also testimony that exposure of an 
improperly premedicated patient to anesthesia not infre-
quently precipitates responses which endanger the life of 
the patient; that agitation and apprehension of the patient 
are danger signals; that the temperature of the patient is 
important, and normally, in an elective operation, anesthesia 
should not be given for 72 hours after the temperature be-
comes normal; and that failing to keep the tissues adequately 
oxygenated is' the forerunner of many anesthetic complica-
tions. All of these, obviously, could involve negligence. It 
was for the jury to say whether it was more probable than 
not that any of them did. Thus, on the new trial, the jury 
should be instructed on this doctrine. 
Liability of the hospital. 
[9] It has heretofore been demonstrated that the jury 
was justified in finding that Dr. Thornburg and Dr. Palm-
berg were negligent. That does not, of course, automatically, 
in the absence of an agency, impose liability on the hospital. 
But there was evidence from which an agency could be 
inferred. Dr. Thornburg testified that he had an active part 
in the management of the hospital. He was its acting admin-
istrator and a member of its board of directors. As acting 
administrator he came to an a"ooreement with the group of 
anesthesiologists with whom' he was connected to furnish a 
proper anesthesiologist upon demand of the hospital. There-
after, as administrator, he presented the proposed plan to 
the directors, and as a member of the board, voted for it. 
« 
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He conceded that either the anesthesiologists or the hospital 
could terminate the agreement at any time. Under this oral 
agreement the hospital got in touch with the group of anes-
thesiologists, and the group sent to the hospital the available 
doctor on the list. The hospital, of course, furnished the 
nurses who attended Reggie, and the operating room nurses. 
It also furnished all equipment used by the anesthesiologist, 
including the anesthetic. . 
When the mother of Reggie brought him to the hospital on 
July 10, 1960, she was required by the hospital officials to 
sign an ,. A uthority to Operate," authorizing the physician 
in charge of Reggie "to administer such treatment and the 
surgeon to have administered such anesthetics as found neces-
sary and to perform the" eye operation. This document was 
not only secured by hospital employees, but was witnessed 
by two employees of the hospital. 
This evidence presented a question of fact to the jury. 
The factual situation is somewhat similar to that presented 
in Seneris v. Haas, 45 Ca1.2d 811 [291 P.2d. 915, 53 A.L.R. 
2d 124], where the hospital was held liable for the negligence 
of an anesthesiologist. There, as here, the anesthesiologist was 
a member of the hospital staff, there, as here, the anesthesi-
ologists used in the hospital were approved and appointed 
by the board of directors upon recommendation of the medical 
staff; the anesthesiologists there, as here, were on call by the 
hospital; there, as here, the anesthesiologist billed the patient; 
there, as here, all medications, white clothing, and nursing 
services, etc., were furnished by the hospital. There, unlike 
here, the anesthesiologist had no separate office, but took his 
calls from the hospital at his home. The court held that such 
a factual situation presented a question of fact as to whether 
an agency existed. The court stated (p. 831): "Unless the 
evidence is susceptible of but a single inference, the question 
of agency is one of fact for the jury [citation]. We said in 
Rice v. Oalifornia Ltlfheran HospitaZ, 27 Ca1.2d 296, 304 [163 
P.2d 860], that 'It should be noted that a nurse or physician 
may be the servant of a hospital, thus requiring the applica-
tion of the doctrine of respondeat superior even though they 
are performing professiol1al acts. [Citations.]' 
"In Stanhope v. Los Angeles Oollege of Ohiropractic, 54 
Cal.App.2d 141, 146 [128 P.2d 705], the court said: '''An 
agency is ostensible when the principal intentionally or by 
want of ordinary care, causes a third person to believe an-
other to be his agent who is not really employed by him." 
(Civ. Code, § 2300.) In this connection it is urged by appel-
lant that "before a recovery can be had against a principal 
for the alleged acts of an ostensible agent, three things must 
be proved, to-wit:" (quoting from H",ll v. Citizens Nat. Trust 
& Sa'/). Bank, 9 Cal.2d 172, 176 [69 P.2d 853]) "[First] The 
person dealing with the agent must do so with belief in the 
agent's authority and this belief must be a reasonable one; 
[second] such belief must be generated by some act or neg-
lect of the principal sought to be charged; [third] and the 
third person in relying on the agent's apparent authority 
must not be guilty of negligence. (1 Cal.Jur. 739; Weintraub 
v. Weingart, 98 Cal.App. 690 [277 P. 752].)" 
" 'An examination of the evidence hereinbefore referred to 
which was produced on the issue of agency convinces us that 
respondent has met the requirements enumerated in the Hill 
case. So far as the record reveals appellant did nothing to 
put respondent on notice that the X-ray laboratory was not 
an integral part of appellant institution, and it cannot seri-
ously be contended that respondent, when he was being car-
ried from room to room suffering excruciating pain, should 
have inquired whether the individual doctors who examined 
him were employees of the college or were independent con-
tractors. Agency is always a question of fact for the jury.' " 
Under the theory of the Seneris case and of the cases re-
ferred to therein (see also Smith v. Fall River Joint Unum 
High School Dist., 118 Cal.App. 673, 681 [5 P.2d 930]; 
Messner v. Board of Dental Examiners, 87 Cal.App. 199, 
204 [262 P. 58]; Riskin v. Industrial Acc. Com., 23 Cal.2d 
248 [144 P.2d 16]) the agency question was one of fact. 
For all of the foregoing reasons the judgments notwith-
standing the verdicts as to all three defendants must be 
reversed. 
The orders granting new triaZs. 
[10] Obviously, the new trial orders must be affirmed. 
One of the grounds specified in the written orders was insuf-
ficiency of the evidence. The granting of a new trial on this 
gr~und is, of course, within the discretion of the trial court. 
(Yarrow v. State of California, 53 Cal.2d 427 [2 Cal.Rptr. 
137, 348 P.2d 687]; Estate of Masrobian, 207 CaLApp.2d 
133 [24 Cal.Rptr. 263].) It is only where it can be said as 
a matter of law that there is no substantial evidence to support 
a different judgment that an appellate court will reverse an 
order granting a new trial on insufficiency. This is not such 
a case. As already pointRd out many of the conclusions that 
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. suppori'~i{aings1'oi negligence by th~'doctOJ'J;est on infer-
ences. ,The trial judge, contrary to the jury, was entitled 
not to make such inferences. Thus the new trial orders must 
be affirmed. 
The judgments notwitbstanding the verdicts as to all three 
defendants are reversed, and the orders granting all three 
defendants a new trial are affirmed, each side to bear its own 
costs on this appeal. 
Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., concurred. 
MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-The trial judge 
in granting the motion for a new trial concluded the evidence 
was insufficient to establish negligence. Under well settled 
law we must ordinarily assume this is so, but here the trial 
court erroneously failed to consider this a conditional res 
ipsa. loquitur case, as the majority opinion so persuasively 
demonstrates it to be. (Davis v. Memorial Hospital (1962) 
58 Cal.2d 815 [26 Cal.Rptr. 633, 376 P.2d 561].) The rule 
under these circumstances is that a "defendant will not be 
held blameless except upon a showing either (1) of a satis-
factory explanation of the accident, that is, an affirmative 
showing of a definite cause for the accident, in which cause 
no element of negligence on the part of the defendant inheres, 
or (2) of such care in all possible respects as necessarily to 
lead to the conclusion that the accident could not have hap-
pened from want of care, but must have been due to some 
unpreventable cause, although the exact cause is unknown. 
In the latter case, inasmuch as the process of reasoning is 
one of exclusion, the care shown must be satisfactory in the 
sense that it covers all causes which due care on the part of 
the defendant might have prevented." (Dierman v. Provi-
dence Hospital (1947) 31 Ca1.2d 290, 295 [188 P.2d 12]; 
RoddisCf'aft, Inc.v. Skelton Logging 00. (1963) 212 Cal. 
App.2d 784 [28 Cal.Rptr. 277]; McDonald v. Foster Memorial 
Hospital (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 85, 102 [338 P.2d 607]; 
Bischoff v. Newby's Tire Service (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 563, 
569 [333 P.2d 44] ; Oldis v. La Societe Francaise (1955) 130 
CalApp.2d 461, 469 [279 P.2d 184]; Talbert v. Ostergaard 
(1954) 129 CalApp.2d 222, 228 [276 P.2d 880].) If the res 
ipsa loquitur inference had been invoked herein, I would find 
that the defendants failed to 'overcome it by adequate affirma-
tive evidence, and the trial court would not, or should not, 
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insufficiency of the evidence. (Gerhardt v. Fresno Medical 
Group (1963) 217 Cal.~PP.2d. 8.58,.~6.1131 Ca~.Rptr.633~.t.J,( 
To approve the grantlDg of 'thism()tion;penalizes the plalD-";i~ 
tiff who offered a proper res ipsa loquitur instruction, favors : 
the defendants who erroneously opposed the res ipsa theory ! 
and instruction, and affirms the trial court which the majority 
opinion finds was in error. This is a result in which I cannot 
acquiesce. 
The majority opinion does not discuss the question of 
excessive damages as a ground for new trial. Defendants 
here concede the injuries were both severe and permanent 
but attempt to support the claim that damages were exces-
sive on the theory that "common knowledge would seem to 
dictate that the life expectancy of a child 6 years old in 
plaintiff's condition could not be long." No authority is 
cited to justify bringing that medical subject under the , 
umbrella of common knowledge. 
I concur in reversing the judgments notwithstanding the 
verdicts. I would reverse the order granting defendants 
a new trial. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-I concur in the judgment. 
Since there is substantial evidence to support a verdict for 
plaintiffs, I agree that the judgments notwithstanding the 
verdict must be reversed. I likewise agree that the orders 
granting a new trial must be affirmed because there is sub-
stantial evidence to support a verdict for defendants. I 
cannot agree, however, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
is applicable or that verdicts could be sustained on certain 
other theories of negligence invoked by the majority opinion. 
"As a general rule, res ipsa loquitur applies where the 
accident is of such a nature that it can be said, in the light 
of past experience, that it probably was the result of negli-
gence by someone and that the defendant is probably the 
person who is responsible. . .. In determining whether such 
probabilities exist with regard to a particular occurrence, the 
courts have relied on both common knowledge and the testi-
mony of expert witneSses." (Siverson v. Weber, 57 Ca1.2d 
834, 836 [22 Cal.Rptr. 337, 372 P.2d 97].) 
Since the possible causes of cardiac arrests are not a matter 
of cOJpmon knowledge (cf. Davis v. Memorial Hospital, 58 
Cal.2d 815, 817 {26 Ca1.Rptr. 633, 376 P.2d 561]), expert 
testimony is required before a conditional res ipsa loquitur 
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probable than not tllat negligence is the cause of cardiac 
arrests, if believed, would permit tlte jury to draw an infer-
ence of negligence solely from the fact that the arrest oc-
curred. In deciding whether an instruction on the doctrine 
should be given, it is therefore irrelevant that there may be 
facts other than the occurrence itself to suggest that the 
arrest was caused by negligence. Although such facts, if 
present, might be independent proof of negligence, they have 
no bearing on the question whether the jury should be per-
mitted to draw an inference of negligence on the happening 
of the cardiac arrest alone. Hence reliance on evidence that 
the defendants may have failed properly to appreciate plain-
tiff's apprehension and temperature is misplaced. The only 
question relevant to determining whether a res ipsa loquitur 
instruction should be given is: Has evidence been offered by 
expert testimony that when cardiac arrests occur, they arc 
more probably than not caused by negligence T 
No such expert testimony appears. Plaintiffs rely on 
testimony of both defendant doctors that, when due care 
is used, cardiac arrests do not ordinarily occur. This testi-
mony, however, fails to establish anything with respect to the 
question whether, among the possible causes, negligence is 
the more probable one when these arrests do occur. It is 
true that cardiac arrests do not ordinarily occur when due 
care is used because, as all the testimony makes clear, a 
cardiac arrest is a rare occurrence. As stated in Siverson v. 
Weber, supra, 57 Cal.2d 834, 839, however, "The fact that 
a particular injury suffered by a patient as the result of an 
operation is something that rarely occurs does not in itself 
prove that the injury was probably caused by the negligence 
of those in charge of the operation." The record shows that 
plaintiffs' counsel was fully aware of this holding in the 
Siverson case. He could easily have framed his questions 
to elicit testimony as to the probability of negligence when 
cardiac arrests occur, but he did not do so. 
Plaintiffs also rely on expert testimony "that 90 percent 
of the deaths occurring in patients under anesthesia are due 
to imprqper management of the airway." This testimony, 
however, cannot reasonably be interpreted to mean that when 
cardiac arrests occur, it is more probable than not that they 
are caused by negligence. 'Thus, this percentage covers deaths 
otller than those following cardiac arrests. The expert who 
offered this estimate testified that deaths may occur under 
anesthesia from disturbances that are at least as likely to 
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happen as cardiac arrests. He did not testify that 90 percent 
of cardiac arrests were caused by improper management of 
the airway. Moreover, his testimony makes clear that by 
"improper management" he did not mean faulty or negligent 
management. He defined "improper management" as any 
failure "to maintain the free movement of air." Although 
he admitted that such failures could be prevented in many 
instances by an anesthesiologist exercising due care, he denied 
that mismanagement by the anesthesiologist is necessarily in-
volved, and could not say that it is probably the cause when 
cardiac arrests occur.l 
Defendant anesthesiologist testified that the most common 
cause of cardiac arrest is direct or indirect stimulation of 
the vagus nerve. He added that in his opinion such stimula-
tion was the cause of this cardiac arrest. He testified furtller 
that there were several stimuli that might have been opera-
tive. This testimony, however, sheds no light on whether 
negligence is more probably than not the cause of bringing 
any of these stimuli into play. Moreover, the record presents 
abundant uncontradicted evidence that the medical profes-
sion is in doubt as to the causes that ultimately bring about 
the physiological events leading to cardiac arrest. In view 
of such evidence, the most that can reasonably be concluded 
from the medical testimony with respect to the probabilities 
of negligence as a cause of cardiac arrest is that negligence 
will increase the risk of its occurrence. There is no expert 
testimony that when it does occur, negligence is more prob-
ably than not the cause. Accordingly, plaintiffs are not 
entitled to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
The question remains whether there is any evidence that 
defendants failed to possess and exercise that reasonable 
degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and 
exercised by members of their profession under similar cir-
cumstances. (Sinz v. Owens, 33 Ca1.2d 749, 753 [205 P.2d 
3, 8 A.L.R.2d 757].) 
There is no evidence that defendant doctors were negligent 
in making the initial decision to operate. Although the child 
IThe testimony in question is as follows: 
"Q. What do you mean by improper management of the airway' 
A. It has not been managed to' maintain the free movement of air." 
"Q. That is due to the anesthesiologist's mismanagement! A. No, 
t.hat doesn't mean that, necessarily. It means that sometimes it is im-
possible to do this." 
"Q. In most instances it is pr('Yental)le in the exercise of due care by 
the anestllesiologist, isn't it, Doctor' A. In many instances it is." 
) 
." -.-) 
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was "'very apprehensive" and "very agitated" on the morn-
ing of the operation, undisputed medical testimony rejected 
the view that this condition contraindicated surgery. The 
hospital records show that preoperative medication,2 admin-
iRtt'red in part to allay the patient's apprehension, was "un-
satisfactory." Defendant anesthesiologist testified that "un-
satisfactory" did not mean "not sedated to the extent he 
should be:" It meant only not "sedated to the extent I 
should like to have [him] sedated." The testimony of the 
Chairman of the Department of Anesthesiology of the Univer-
sity of California at San Francisco confirmed that many 
children are ,. very apprehensive"8 just prior to an opera-
tion and that an attempt to reduce this apprehension by 
further sedation might dangerously depress circulation and 
respiration. This expert also testified that he would have 
administered anesthesia .. under those circumstances" and 
that standard practice did not require the anesthesiologist 
to postpone it. Plaintiffs introduced no other testimony that 
would permit a jury to evaluate the significance of "very 
apprehensive," "very agitated," and "unsatisfactory" in a 
medical context. Hence, even if the jury did not believe 
the explanations offered, plaintiffs would not have met their 
burden of proof. 
The record of the child's temperature adds no more. The 
temperature had risen to 100.6 on the eve of surgery. Defend-
ant ophthalmologist investigated the fever and found that 
the rise was not due to any infection that would increase 
the risk of complications under anesthesia. Plaintiffs offered 
no evidence to the contrary. The hospital chart shows that 
the child's temperature was below normal on the morning of 
surgery. Medical experts testified that such a sequence of 
events would not contraindicate surgery. Although a hand-
2Defendant anesthesiologist offered undisputed testimony that nem-
butal was administered to allay apprehension; atropine, to depress 
reflexes and decrease secretions. Although the dosage of atropine was 
twi<'e that given at the flrst operation, there is no evidence connecting 
that increase with the possible causes of cardiac arrest. On the contrary. 
ilef('ndant anesthesiologist testified that atropine is used specifically to 
.lecrease the 8cnsit.h·ity of the vagus nerve t.o reflexes that may occur 
.luring anesthesia. Moreover, expert testimony is uncontradicted that tile 
('hild was prep~red for the operation according to standard procedures. 
8Neither party ask('d this expert any qUe8tions about the significance 
of ,. very agitated." Defendant n:!Iest.hesiologist, who used this term in 
llis post·opernth·e report, testified' that be usl'd it as a synonym for 
"very IIppr('hensive." He also testified that he used "very apprehen-
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writing expert testified that a relevant part of the tempera-! 
ture chart showed signs of an erasure, he also testified that <1 
there "was no indication under the microscope of what had ! 
been erased nor precisely where it was." Moreover, on cross-
examination he •• oouldn 't positively say" that there had been 
any writing beneath the erasure. No jury could reasonably 
make a finding of negligence on the basis of such testimony. 
There is also no evidence that defendant ophthalmologist 
was under a duty either to possess the skill to perform a 
thoracotomy in the event of a cardiae arrest, or to see to it 
that a competent surgeon was in the operating room at all 
times. Every medical witness testified that it was standard 
practice to call in a thoracic or general surgeon in the event 
of cardiac arrest. No medical witness testified that it was 
standard practice for an ophthalmologist to possess such skill. 
It is true that one surgeon, who otherwise agreed with these 
conclusions, said on cross-examination, Ie Anybody, any sur-
geon who is operating in a hospital, ... in dire circumstances 
should be able to do an open chest operation. " Yet he added, 
"However, if he has any choice whatsoever and he has never 
done this, and he has anyone better qualified in the immediate 
vicinity he is well advised to have them do it." The rest of 
this surgeon's testimony indicates that by "immediate vicin-
ity" he did not mean that a competent surgeon ought always 
to be present in the operating room itself. Moreover, this 
expert testified that he had been active in the local campaign 
designed to alert all specialists to the possibility of cardiac 
arrest and to inform them about the procedure of thoracotomy. 
Yet he testified that despite this campaign most specialists 
could not be expected to perform the operation. Hence his 
statement that any operating surgeon should be able to open 
a chest can reasonably be interpreted only as an expression 
of an ideal that had not yet become a standard of care. Hence 
no jury could reasonably conclude that defendant ophthal-
mologist failed to meet the standard of care by not performing 
the thoracotomy himself or not insuring the presence of a 
competent surgeon in the operating room at all times. 
There is evidence, howe,'er, that defendants were negligent 
in failing to make reasonable preparation for the possible 
occu'rrence of a cardiac arrest. (See Harper and James, The 
Law of Torts (195{j) § 16.11, p. 939; Prosser on Torts (3d 
ed. 1964) pp. 173, 343-344.) Both defendant doctors knew 
that cardiac arrest was 8n inherent risk of surgery under 
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anesthesia. Both testified that when an arrest occurs every 
second counts. Both doctors had good reason to believe that 
a general surgeon would be readily available in the area sur-
rounding the operating room. It may be inferred, however, 
that they did not confer before the operation to plan an 
efficient procedure for summoning such a surgeon in response 
to a possible emergency. Thus, defendant ophthalmologist 
testified that he could not remember any conversation with 
the anesthesiologist, although "frequently we have a conver-
sation about the operation prior to surgery. " Moreover, 
defendant anesthesiologist was apparently unaware of the 
inability of defendant ophthalmologist to perform a thora-
cotomy, for when tIle arrest occurred he did not immediately 
send for a general surgeon. Instead, after it became appar-
ent that external massage had failed, precious time elapsed 
while the ophthalmologist came to the table, revealed his 
inability to open the chest, and went to the door to get the 
general surgeon. More time passed while the general surgeon 
entered the room and put on gloves before making the 
incision. Althougll the record does not specify how much 
time these steps entailed, a jury could reasonably conclude 
from defendant ophthalmologist's testimony that the addi-
tional loss of time was enough to cause the brain damage. 
This time might have been saved had preparations been made 
for summoning the general surgeon as soon as a cardiac arrest 
was suspected, so that he could be ready to open the chest 
at the moment it became apparent that external massage 
had failed. 
Although there is no expert testimony that the prevailing 
medical standard of care requires such preparation for a 
possible cardiac arrest, expert testimony is not required when 
scientific enlightenment is not necessary to show that failure 
to malte such preparations is unreasonable. (Ales v. Ryan, 
8 Cal.2d 82, 100 [64 P.2d 409] ; Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 
206, 214 [291 P. 173J; see Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Ca1.2d 81, 
86 [147 P.2d 604] ; B!'uce v. United States, 167 F.Supp. 579, 
583; Prosser on Torts (3d ed. 1964) p.167.) On that basis 
alone, I would reverse the judgments notwithstanding the 
verdicts. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment in 
favor of d~endants for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice 
Salsman in the opinion prepared by him for the District 
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Court of Appeal in Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital (Cal. 
App.) 38 Cal.Rptr. 749. 
Schauer, J.,. concurred. 
Respondents' petitions for a rehearing were denied January 
13, 1965. Traynor, C. J., and McComb, J., were of the 
opinion that the petitions should be granted. 
